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When the World Around You Is Changing
Investigating the Inﬂuence of Alienation
and Indifference on Voter Turnout
Alexander Wuttke
Introduction
Every few years the citizens of democratic countries are called to the voting
booth to determine which representatives shall speak on their behalf. Yet not
everybody answers this call, and while some citizens decide to vote, others
abstain. Acknowledging the paramount importance of elections in integrating
a democratically organized society and in distributing the political power
within it, many studies examine what induces eligible voters to cast a ballot
or to refrain from this focal form of political participation. One strand of
research investigating the determinants of turnout decisions focuses on iden-
tifying individual predispositions, such as cognitive resources and civic
skills (Brady et al. 1995), values (Dalton 2009), personality traits (Dinesen et al.
2014), and even genetic dispositions (Klemmensen et al. 2012). Since predis-
positions are assumed to be more or less constant over time, the predisposition
approach suggests that electoral participation is relatively stable both on
the individual as well as on the aggregate level. Turnout rates, however, do
vary over time. A second approach in the literature on voter turnout addresses
features of the constantly changing political environment (Blais andDobrzynska
1998; Dalton 2008; Blais et al. 2014). Since no election is like any other, the
dynamic-contextual approach argues that individual turnout decisions are inﬂu-
enced by the electoral context in which a voter is embedded when making the
turnout decision. Phenomena like the declining turnout rates in many western
democracies over the past decades (Dalton 2014) are thus explained by pointing
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to the changing nature of elections over time (Franklin 2004; Johnston et al.
2007), whereas scholars following the predisposition approach will focus on
the changing composition of the electorate due to generational replacement
(see Putnam 2000; Blais et al. 2004; Dalton 2009). The predisposition approach
places little emphasis on political context, focuses on the differences between
individuals, and assumes a great deal of intra-individual stability. The dynamic-
contextual approach, on the other hand, suggests intertemporal variability in an
individual’s decision to turn out to vote as a consequence of transformations in
the political environment.
One important source of contextual variation is the political supply provided
by the competing political parties. This chapter investigates the amount of
variability in individual turnout decisions over time and its dependence on
the changing characteristics of political parties as one feature of the political
context. Both the scholarly literature and the conventional wisdom of public
discourse frequently allude to the alleged importance of voters’ perceptions of
the political parties and their offerings when making the decision whether to
turn out at a given election. We investigate whether and to what degree
changes in the perception of political parties over time have the capacity to
mobilize previous abstainers to cast a ballot (or to demobilize previous parti-
cipants), using data which combines observed changes in the political supply
over time with actual reactions in the reported behavior of voters. Long-term
panel data on German elections from 1994 to 2013 traces each voter over
several years to document individual responses to variations in the political
context. On the surface, the German party system’s structure has remained
unchanged insofar as no new political parties have gained parliamentary
presence. However, on closer inspection, this is an excellent case for studying
the consequences of shifting offerings by political parties, as all the major
parties ﬂipped on key political issues and often changed their programmatic
proﬁle substantially (Linhart and Shikano 2009; Saalfeld and Schoen 2015).
In the observed time period, the former socialist party changed its name to the
“Left Party” after merging with an electoral alliance that was formed in 2005
by dissatisﬁed Social Democrats (Paterson and Sloam 2006; Patton 2006). Its
establishment can be understood as a reaction to a major policy shift toward
“market social democracy” (Nachtwey 2013) by a coalition government of the
center-left parties, the SPD and the Greens. The coalition had taken ofﬁce in
1998 and pursued a reform program which included cutting social beneﬁts
and the deregulation of labor rights (Menz 2010). Furthermore, soon after
taking ofﬁce, the formerly paciﬁst Green Party agreed to German participation
in the 1999 KosovoWar (Hyde-Price 2001). In a similar vein, the conservative
union of the CDU/CSU and FDP ﬂip-ﬂopped on the issue of nuclear energy.
Furthermore, the conservatives faced substantial internal divisions regarding
the proper response to the euro crisis. In the end, the euro crisis resulted in
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the emergence of a new Eurosceptic and migration-sceptic party, the AfD
(Arzheimer 2015).
The empirical analysis shows that, on average, these developments were
perceived by voters as modest changes in party positions over time. In line
with the dynamic-contextual approach, this study provides evidence that the
offerings of political parties exert a meaningful inﬂuence on turnout. In
accordance with the predisposition approach, however, it shows that these
effects of the political supply are limited to a small subgroup of the electorate
while the electoral participation of the majority is characterized by inertia.
Voter Turnout and Political Supply
Individuals acquire and develop characteristics that shape their general pro-
pensity toward electoral participation through genetic inheritance and social-
ization by family, peers, or the media (Wolﬁnger and Rosenstone 1980; Sapiro
2004). Yet, the decision whether to vote or not vote is not ﬁxed throughout a
person’s lifetime. For each and every election, and therefore within a context
which is undergoing constant change, the decision to turn out has to be
renewed. The inﬂuence of stable predispositions interacts with the inﬂuence
of changing context to shape turnout decisions on two dimensions. First, the
political context might change with regard to how well a speciﬁc election
matches a person’s general needs and preferences. Second, the strength of
contextual effects on an individual’s behavior will be moderated by their
motivation and capacity to perceive and process the dynamics of the political
environment. Nonetheless, how the perceived political environment of an
election affects turnout behavior in interaction with individual predisposi-
tions is not properly understood.
A natural starting point for understanding the context dependency of
turnout decisions is the supply of political parties and voters’ perceptions of
how these parties change their images and programmatic proﬁles over time.
Political parties are highly visible actors on the political stage and serve a
crucial linkage function (Lawson 1980) between the government on the one
hand and the citizens on the other hand. Giovanni Sartori (2005: 471) once
claimed that “citizens inWestern democracies are represented through and by
parties. This is inevitable.” Parties are the main gateway through which citi-
zens interact with the state and inﬂuence the distribution of power within its
legislative body. For this reason, scholars have long considered that the atti-
tudes citizens have toward political parties and the inﬂuence parties have on
their decisions concerning electoral participation play a signiﬁcant part in the
political process (Brody and Page 1973).
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Political parties reduce complexity by structuring the menu of political
options fromwhich a voter can choose. By doing so, parties act as gatekeepers,
since citizens cannot vote for policies that are not offered by any of the
political parties on the ballot. Whether voters face “meaningful choices”
(Weßels and Schmitt 2008) depends on the positions the political parties
choose to represent. The more similar the offerings of the political parties,
the higher the probability that some voters will not ﬁnd their views repre-
sented, a situation which then opens up a “representational deﬁcit” (Alvarez
et al. 2014). Accordingly, the “responsible party model” (APSA Task Force
Report 1950) urges political parties to put forward distinct policy platforms
that differentiate them from one another.
The mechanism by which parties are compared and evaluated, however, is
not clear-cut. Although party-related effects on electoral participation are
usually discussed in terms of policies, attitudes toward political parties may
derive from a broad variety of sources, i.e., their personnel, the content and
style of their communication, personal experiences with their members, and
further idiosyncratic factors. All of these factors shape a voter’s perception
of the parties to a greater or lesser extent and may be incorporated into
their judgment about whether it is worth making their way to the voting
booth. Party-related attitudes inﬂuence turnout decisions through two basic
mechanisms. First, when all parties in the voter’s choice set offer a similar
proﬁle, casting a ballot will not make a difference, the utility from voting will
approximate zero (Downs 1957), and a citizen “fails to vote because he does
not have a clear preference between partisan objects” (Campbell et al. 1960:
97). This is referred to as indifference. Second, a voter is subject to alienation
when his preferences are not met by any party in his choice set (Brody and
Page 1973).While tendencies to alienation and indifference will both decrease
with increasing diversity in the choice set, they are distinct concepts. Alien-
ation entails comparisons of the voter’s preferences with each of the parties’
proﬁles and represents the distance from the closest match to any of the
available parties. By contrast, indifference results from the similarities of the
parties’ platforms. In other words, while indifference results from looking at
how the parties’ platforms compare with one another, alienation results from
a comparison of the policy platforms with the voter’s own preferences.
Previous studies which employ the concepts of indifference and alienation
to investigate the role of political supply and voter turnout from an economic
standpoint (Plane and Gershtenson 2004; Adams et al. 2006; Hortala-Vallve
and Esteve-Volart 2011) or from a social-psychological perspective (Weßels
and Schmitt 2008; Blais et al. 2014; Rogowski 2014; Steinbrecher 2014) con-
sistently report effects of the political context on electoral participation.
Compared to other predictors such as voting as a civic duty (Blais 2000) or
get-out-the-vote activities (Green and Gerber 2008), however, these effects are
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 1/6/2017, SPi
Alienation, Indifference, and Voter Turnout
149
Comp. by: C. Vijayakumar Stage : Proof ChapterID: 0003135660 Date:1/6/17
Time:20:33:19 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0003135660.3D
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 150
relatively small.1 This points to the cascade of requirements that must be met
for an individual’s choice set to inﬂuence turnout decisions (Brody and Page
1973). First, political parties must change signiﬁcantly over time, which,
secondly, needs to be recognized and memorized by the voter. Third, this
has to be considered in a voter’s calculus of political participation.
These assumptions warrant further elaboration. They imply varying effects
on turnout decisions, depending on the criteria by which the parties are
assessed as well as the individual characteristics of the voter. Voters can base
their voting decision only on events and facts of which they are aware. Many
citizens do not just lack the capacity but also the motivation to make fully
informed political decisions. Only a few citizens follow political news closely
and are interested in the details of the political process (Luskin 1990). Regard-
ing the distribution of political information among the electorate, Philip
Converse (2000: 331) concluded that “the mean level is very low but the
variance is very high.” While voters can make up for a lack of factual know-
ledge by employing informational shortcuts, these heuristics also depend on a
prior informational basis and therefore do not necessarily close the gap
between low- and high-information citizens (Schoen 2006; Levendusky
2011). Accordingly, changes in the political context over time should exert
stronger inﬂuences on turnout decisions among politically interested and
sophisticated voters.
Also, some criteria to evaluate parties require more knowledge or cognitive
efforts than others. Policy-based attitudes toward political parties are particu-
larly demanding. They require crystallized opinions about speciﬁc political
topics and concrete knowledge about the parties’ position on these issues.
A large segment of the electorate does not meet one or both of these condi-
tions (Achen and Bartels 2016). As a result, more generalized evaluations of
political parties that also take more diffuse considerations into account
(i.e., perceptions of candidates and communicative styles) are more likely to
be behaviorally relevant for the average citizen as they may incorporate
information that requires less effort to acquire and to process (Lenz 2012).
To conclude, changes in how political parties are perceived from one elec-
tion to the next are hypothesized to play a role when a voter calculates
whether or not to cast a ballot. This effect should be moderated by a voter’s
cognitive mobilization, and stronger effects are expected for general party-
related attitudes than for policy-based evaluations.
1 Yet the relationship between turnout intentions and issue congruence with political parties is
strong when potential voters are surveyed right after using a voting advice platform, suggesting
that the presumedmechanisms are indeed at work but attenuated by limited knowledge of and low
salience of the parties’ policy stances (Dinas et al. 2014).
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Data and Methods
Narrowing down the political parties’ impact on individual turnout is chal-
lenging. The issue at stake concerns individual reactions to a political context
which is changing over time. Accordingly, data is needed that traces voter
attitudes and behavior over long time periods within a dynamic context.
Besides some experiments in the lab (Hobolt and Wittrock 2011), however,
the literature on indifference and alienation solely relies on cross-sectional
data which takes a snapshot of attitudes at one point in time.With this type of
data, the isolation of a causal effect against spurious associations is difﬁcult as
several assumptions must be met whose validity is unknown (Bollen 1989: 41;
Halaby 2004). This study employs long-term panel data that observes voters’
perceptions of the changing political context and their behavior over a max-
imum of three elections. Compared to cross-sectional data which looks at
differences between individuals, the analysis strategy pursued here considers
variation within individuals over time. This drastically reduces the problem
of unobserved heterogeneity (Levendusky 2011; but for a general counter-
argument, see Bell and Jones 2015) and makes it possible to test whether
changes in the political menu a voter chooses from actually lead to changes
in turnout behavior.
To investigate this question the GLES long-term panels and their predeces-
sors were used (Falter et al. 2012; Rattinger 2012; Rattinger et al. 2012a;
Rattinger et al. 2016a; Rattinger et al. 2016b). Beginning with the 1994 federal
election and overlapping with each other, the long-term panel datasets follow
voters over the course of three elections.2 The ﬁve long-term panels were
merged and the analysis was run across the combined dataset in order to
preserve a sufﬁciently large sample size allowing for multivariate analyses. In
total, 21,642 individuals were surveyed. Several factors, however, contributed
to a drastic reduction of the original sample size which resulted in the inclu-
sion of only a couple of hundred individuals in the expanded models.
The severe reduction of sample size was caused, ﬁrst, by panel attrition
which left us with 10,328 individuals that had been surveyed more than
once. Panel dropout is usually associated with respondent’s characteristics
and might therefore lead to an unrepresentative sample and to biased coefﬁ-
cients. For this reason, analyses of the association of panel attrition and
turnout behavior will be reported later on. The second reason for the drastic
shrinkage in sample size was missing values generated by the aggregation of
several surveys. Some variables were not included in every survey (see Table 8.A1
in the Appendix). If one variable had not been surveyed in one wave, every
2 The most recent long-term panel dataset began with the 2009 federal election and will end in
2017.
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observation from that wave had to be removed from the analysis even though
information on all the other attributes was available. Missing data because of
omitted instruments reﬂects the decisions of the researcher and is therefore
associated with his or her characteristics but not necessarily with the charac-
teristics of the respondents. This makes themissing data in this study different
from other kinds of missing data which are the result of a respondent’s
decision not to answer a question or the survey as a whole. In the present
case, “the probability of missing data on Y is unrelated to the value of Y itself
or to the values of any other variables in the data set” (Allison 2010: 4). This
type of missing data does not lead to biased coefﬁcients. But it still leads to a
massive reduction in the sample size by almost 50 percent, and when the
statistical power of an analysis is low, the probability of type-2 errors is inﬂated
and true associations might be overlooked. Therefore, in addition to simple
models which were based on listwise deletion and small sample sizes, models
with imputed values were estimated to make use of all the information avail-
able and to increase the models’ efﬁciency (Ibrahim and Molenberghs 2009;
Romaniuk et al. 2014). The multiple imputation procedure was conducted
with the software RealcomImpute (Carpenter et al. 2011), which is able to
utilize the hierarchical nature of longitudinal data.3
Third, the reduced sample size was also a deliberate consequence of the
chosen method of analyzing the outcome variable, reported voter turnout or
turnout intention in the case of a pre-election survey. To account for the
outcome’s binary nature and for the longitudinal type of data, logistic condi-
tional ﬁxed-effects regressions were used (Allison 2009). The interpretation of
the obtained estimates is less straightforward than the interpretation of linear
ﬁxed-effects regressions. Still, logistic ﬁxed effects likewise only consider intra-
individual changes and cancel out all the time-invariant heterogeneity. The
analysis only included individuals whose turnout behavior changed over the
observed time period. Restricting the analysis to cases where the dependent
variable varies over time is sometimes viewed as a deﬁciency of ﬁxed-effects
models (Nielsen and Alderson 1995: 685; Bell and Jones 2015: 139). Indeed,
prima facie the resulting shrinkage of sample size leads to a lowered statistical
efﬁciency. Still, this approach protects against biased parameter estimators
and restricts the sample to cases that actually help investigate the research
3 RealcomImpute uses a multivariate normal imputation model which is known to perform well
even with binary and ordinary variables (Lee and Carlin 2010). Fifteen imputed datasets were
created based on 7500 iterations and a “burn in” period of 1000 updates (Graham et al. 2007).
Although the distribution of the observed variables violates the assumption of normality,
following the methodological literature variable transformation was not used (Hippel 2013;
Rodwell et al. 2014). Missing values on the dependent variable were not imputed. Although
multiple imputation of longitudinal data is still subject to ongoing research and guidelines are
sparse, evidence shows that analytical results are only modestly sensitive to imputation decisions
(Romaniuk et al. 2014).
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question, which is concerned with identifying the factors that inﬂuence
(= change) turnout behavior over time. Thus, the restricted sample size is
not a bug; it is a feature (Halaby 2004: 523; Giesselmann and Windzio 2012:
149). Although respondents who have always or never voted over the course
of three elections and who are seemingly unmoved by shifts in the parties’
positions are excluded from the analysis, this does not mean that these
individuals are principally immune to a changing political context. It is
possible that more pronounced movements of political parties or the entry
of new parties could have led some citizens to behave differently. This strategy
of analysis, therefore, reminds us that the conclusions we can draw from the
obtained results are contingent on the speciﬁc data we have observed which is
in the context of the German party system from 1994 to 2013.
Alienation from and indifference toward political parties are the main
explanatory variables. Since policy-related and more general evaluations of
political parties were argued to be conceptually distinct and to function
differently depending on voters’ attributes, more than one indicator was
included to measure alienation and indifference. To represent speciﬁc issues,
questions on immigration and on nuclear power were used.4 Self-placement
and perceived party positions on a left–right scale alsomeasure position issues,
but in the more generalized form of ideological orientations. In addition to
these policy-related measures, valence-based indifference and valence-based
alienation capture whether a voter assumes all parties to be equally well
equipped for solving the country’s most- or second-most important problem
and whether a voter considers no party to be competent at solving these
problems. Finally, general evaluation scores of the parties will be referred to
as summary evaluations. In contrast to the former measures which require
very speciﬁc pieces of knowledge, a voter has leeway in selecting and weight-
ing considerations when constructing subjective summary evaluations of a
political party. In the above order, therefore, these dimensions of party evalu-
ations require decreasing levels of cognitive capacities and of political aware-
ness. General evaluation scores represent the most diffuse measure of how
well a voter and a party are matched, and policy-based items are assumed to be
cognitively demanding and the least likely to inﬂuence the turnout decisions
of the average voter.
Alienation was calculated as the difference between an individual and the
party closest to it, and in the case of the summary evaluation it was calculated
4 One problem with cumulated datasets is inconsistencies of the question format over time. In
this case, the gravest inconsistency is the varying question format of an instrument on nuclear
power that was replaced by a question on climate change in 2013 after Germany had abandoned
nuclear power in an all-party consensus. Both items aim tomeasure the perceived party’s stance on
energy policy. No irregularities are apparent in the data structure due to the change of instrument
(see Figure 8.1).
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as the difference of the most liked party’s score to the scale’s maximum
(Melton 2009; Steinbrecher 2014: 266–8). Indifference was calculated as the
difference between the closest/most liked party and the second-closest/most
liked party.5 As ﬁxed-effects regression modelling is employed, all time-
invariant heterogeneity is accounted for by design, and stable covariates
such as sex or educational status do not need to be included. But party
identiﬁcation (dichotomous), satisfaction with democracy, and acceptance
of voting as a civic duty were also included as control variables. As these
variables might be inﬂuenced by party-related attitudes themselves in some
cases, controlling for these covariates represents a conservative test of the
inﬂuence of alienation and indifference on turnout decisions. Included in
the analyses were those parties that were represented in the German parlia-
ment from 1994 through 2013.
Results
In the ﬁrst step, we investigated whether and to what magnitude individual
turnout decisions change over time. Over the course of three elections, only
1382 (13.8 percent) of the 10,328 eligible voters in the dataset switched
electoral participation at least once. The vast majority of voters either always
or never cast a ballot. If one assumed turnout decisions to be completely
random, one would predict a minority of 25 percent of the voters to have a
straight participation record of either always or never voting after observing
three election cycles. In reality, with a share of 87 percent the image is inverted
and biased towards persistent inertia in voting behavior. The estimated por-
tion of switchers might be biased in relation to the general public and to the
initial ﬁrst-wave sample if stability in electoral participation was correlated
with survey participation in subsequent waves. If individuals who consist-
ently do not vote and individuals who always vote tend to drop out of the
repeated surveys at higher rates than respondents who vote from time to time,
then the share of switchers would have been overestimated due to panel
attrition. A multivariate regression on those who responded to at least two
survey waves, however, showed that being an electoral switcher does not
predict participation in the third survey wave (Figure 8.A1 in the Appendix),
lending credibility to the reported share of switchers.6
5 Calculating the difference between themain parties competing for the chancellorship (the SPD
and the CDU/CSU) leads to similar results.
6 The well-known respondents’ tendency to overreport turnout rates (see Selb and Munzert
2013) is a less severe problem when ﬁxed-effects modeling is employed, but it might contribute
to underestimating the share of switchers, if it leads switchers to polish their turnout record.
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Compared to the share of 40 percent of German citizens who vote for
different parties from one election to the next (Schoen 2003; Dassonneville
and Hooghe 2016), the decision whether to vote at all seems relatively stable
and less context-dependent. This is the ﬁrst substantively important piece of
evidence for understanding context sensitivity. In the observed time period,
potential effects of the political context on electoral participation were limited
to a small portion of the electorate, while the turnout decision of the majority
of voters was unaffected by the political environment and remained
unchanged. The share of switchers estimated at 14 percent can be seen as
the upper bound of potential context effects. Whether those voters who
changed their turnout behavior did so because of dynamics in the proﬁles of
the political parties is investigated in the following analyses.
Figure 8.1 reports the development of the mean perceived positions and
evaluations of the main German political parties7 that were represented in the
German parliament between 1994 and 2013.8 Visible ideological party shifts
were perceived by the voters only for the Left Party and the Greens. The policy
shifts during the red–green coalition from 1998–2005 changed how the elect-
orate perceived the parties’ ideological positions, yet more modestly than
expected and surprisingly without any effect for the SPD. The Greens were
seen to have moved to the center, while the Left Party was perceived to have
shifted in the opposite direction to the party system’s left margin. At the latest
election, this development was reversed and the parties left of center returned
to their 1998 positions.
Political parties’ summary evaluations varied more strongly. The Free
Democrats in particular experienced a massive electoral loss at the 2013
election. They lost most of the sympathy they had gained since 1994 and
were outperformed by the left for the ﬁrst time. Looking at the two speciﬁc
issue questions, one can witness a slightly growing concentration in the
political center. To conclude, within a stable framework and on a smaller
scale compared to other countries’ party systems, the German political parties
did shift positions between 1994 and 2013. The electorate recognized these
movements, although smaller in magnitude than the shifts analyzed by
scholars. Summary evaluations varied considerably among some parties. All
in all, there is room for the changes in party-related attitudes from one
election to the next to have inﬂuenced voters’ turnout decisions.
7 The newly founded AfD was not included in the analysis to maintain consistency in including
only parties represented in parliament. Furthermore, only a subset of indicators was surveyed on
this party. Including the available indicators on the AfD in the analyses only marginally changes
the results.
8 The mean values were calculated for respondents who are included in later analyses and
switched electoral participation at least once.
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While the electorate’s aggregated and averaged perception of the parties
provides a ﬁrst impression of changes in the party system, it is necessary to
conduct analysis at the individual level to ensure adequate results and, specif-
ically, review intra-individual changes over time. Table 8.1 provides an over-
view of the explanatory variables and their temporal variation. The right-hand
column reports the amount of changes over time and the distribution of the
change score among the individuals; the middle column reports the absolute
level on which these changes occur. Notice the example of alienation with
regard to the parties’ position on nuclear power: for the average voter, the
distance to the closest party on a scale from 0 to 10 for that issue is 0.84 units.
The standard deviation of 0.05 indicates a low variance of alienation with
respect to parties’ position on nuclear power across individuals, i.e., for
roughly 95 percent of the voters its level lies within the interval from 0.74 to
0.94. From one election to the next, alienation with respect to the parties’
position on nuclear power increases or decreases by 0.1 points for the average
voter. Yet the degree of dynamics between elections varies widely across
individuals. For 75 percent of the voters, this measure of alienation does not
change at all. The upper ﬁfth percentile of the highest change score has a
change score larger than 0.52. The issue of nuclear power is exemplary for
most independent variables and complements the earlier results which
showed moderate temporal changes by the political parties: the independent
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Figure 8.1 Development of political parties’mean evaluations and perceived positions,
1994–2013
Notes: Demographic weight applied. Big round markers indicate the use of irregular items. Left–
right position in 1994 is based on GESIS dataset ZA4909.
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variables do vary over time. A comparison with other political attitudes in the
upper rows of Table 8.1 underscores the observation that the intra-individual
changes of party-related attitudes are nonetheless modest in magnitude.
In line with the development of party perceptions (Figure 8.1), the intra-
individual changes with respect to indifference and alienation do not follow a
trend in any direction (for development of mean values, see Figure 8.A2 and
Figure 8.A3 in the Appendix). As none of the indicators increased or decreased
noticeably in the observed time period on the aggregate level, the political
context is unlikely to have caused macro-level trends in declining or increas-
ing turnout. Be that as it may, the necessary requirements for context effects
on the individual level are met. Political parties shifted their positions over
time, voters featured intra-individual malleability in the evaluation of the
political supply, and a segment of the electorate changed turnout behavior
over time. Whether dynamics in individual turnout behavior can indeed be
interpreted as a reaction to party behavior will be examined in the next step.
The regression analysis will investigate whether intra-individual changes of a
voter’s turnout decision go along with changes in the voter’s evaluation of the
political parties.
Figure 8.2 displays the results of the conditional ﬁxed-effects regressions
with intended and reported turnout as an independent variable.9 Reported
are odds ratios and conﬁdence intervals at a level of certainty of 95 percent.
Table 8.1 Distribution of core variables and dynamics among switchers
Level Change between Elections
Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD 75th 95th
percentile
Civic Duty 2.80 0.05 0 4 847 0.32 0.33 0.67 1.33
Satisfaction with Democracy 1.91 0.04 0 4 830 0.29 0.33 0.40 1.33
Party Identiﬁcation 0.66 0.02 0 1 858 0.11 0.17 0.33 0.33
Political Interest 2.07 0.04 0 4 872 0.21 0.31 0.33 0.71
Alienation: Ideological 0.58 0.04 0 10 735 0.09 0.26 0.00 0.67
Indifference: Ideological 0.89 0.04 10 0 725 0.11 0.25 0.33 0.67
Alienation: Evaluation 2.47 0.08 0 10 864 0.49 0.73 0.67 2.00
Indifference: Evaluation 1.59 0.06 10 0 861 0.28 0.48 0.33 1.33
Alienation: Valence 0.36 0.02 0 1 751 0.08 0.16 0.00 0.33
Indifference: Valence 0.05 0.01 0 1 751 0.03 0.11 0.00 0.33
Alienation: Nuclear Power 0.84 0.05 0 10 788 0.10 0.31 0.00 0.52
Indifference: Nuclear Power 1.15 0.06 10 0 753 0.11 0.35 0.00 0.52
Alienation: Foreigners 1.20 0.07 0 10 702 0.09 0.31 0.00 0.52
Indifference: Foreigners 1.43 0.08 10 0 561 0.10 0.35 0.00 0.52
9 Several ﬁgures in this chapter were created using Stata Ado –coefplot– by Ben Jann (2014) and
the graph scheme –burd– by François Briatte.
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The vertical line in both panels indicates odds ratios of 1, which equals no
effect. Interpreting results from a conditional ﬁxed-effects regression follows
the same logic as a simple logistic regression. An odds ratio of 0.5 of ideological
alienation, for example, is to be interpreted as follows: when the distance
between a voter and the political party closest to him/her grows by one unit
on the eleven-point left–right scale, then the voter’s probability of casting a
ballot at the upcoming election drops by 50 percent. Note that for visual
clarity the x-scales of both panels are logarithmized.
The bivariate analyses (Figure 8.2, Panel 1) show that most indicators of a
voter’s changing perception of the political supply are unrelated to variations
in electoral participation over time.10 As anticipated, the different dimensions
of parties’ positions do not inﬂuence voting behavior equally. The cognitively
more demanding indicators that are conceptually closest to speciﬁc policies
are not associated with electoral participation, while the more general orien-
tations are. Only the valence-based indicators which measure the perceived
competence of political parties regarding the solution of a country’s problems,
as well as the two items indicating the summary evaluation of the individual
parties, are statistically distinguishable from zero.
Model I aims at disentangling the effect of each variable while controlling
for the others.11 When alienation and indifference are both included in the
model, only the perception of not being represented by the parties inﬂuences
individual electoral participation. In that scenario, the perceived difference
between the parties is not consequential.
Although ﬁxed-effects regressions account for all time-invariant heterogen-
eity, the nextmodel includes covariates that are known to be highly predictive
of abstention (Geys 2006) in order to additionally control for time-variant
unobserved heterogeneity.12 As a consequence, the standard errors of all
variables increase noticeably and only the alienation coefﬁcient of the sum-
mary evaluation is statistically distinguishable from zero with a 95 percent
conﬁdence interval.
So far, the discussion of the results has focused onwhether the perception of
the parties by the respondents exerted any effect on turnout at all. Coefﬁcients
from logistic regression models are notoriously difﬁcult to interpret and effect
sizes are hard to compare. Usually, researchers rely on a visual representation
of predicted outcomes or marginal effects (Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan 2013).
10 Regression tables of all the models shown with observed values can be found in Table 8.A2 in
the Appendix.
11 The issue-speciﬁc items were not included, because the bivariate analyses didn’t show any
association with electoral participation and their inclusion would have reduced the sample size
noticeably. The items are included in the imputed model.
12 Since the control variables might be inﬂuenced by the political supply themselves and might
mediate some of the political supply’s indirect effect on turnout, this model follows a conservative
design that possibly underestimates political supply’s inﬂuence.
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This cannot be applied in this case because conditional ﬁxed-effects models
cancel the time-invariant elements that would be necessary for this effort out
of the equation. Although this is a less straightforward procedure, we can
calculate conditional probabilities.13 It is possible to calculate the conditional
probability that the dependent variable is equal to one (= casting the ballot) in
one survey wave, given the condition that the dependent variable equals zero
in all other survey waves. In order to get a better understanding of a variable’s
(relative) effect size, I manipulate the values of one independent variable of
interest while holding the covariates constant, and estimate the change in
conditional probabilities.What is calculated, speaking plainly, is the inﬂuence
of a variable on persuading someone who did not vote before to cast a ballot.
Each of the datasets comprises three waves. Assuming that a voter switches
from abstention to turnout exactly once in the observed period of time, the
prior probability for the occurrence of this switch at a speciﬁc election is 1/3.
Alienation: Summary Evaluation
Alienation: Ideological
Alienation: Nuclear Power
Indifference: Summary Evaluation
Indifference: Nuclear Power
Indifference: Ideological
Alienation: Valence
Indifference: Valence
Alienation: Foreigners
Indifference: Foreigners
Civic Duty
Satisfaction with Democracy
PID (d)
Interest in Politics
.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Bivariate Model l + Model l + Control Model ll
Panel 1: Observed Values Panel 2: Imputed Values
Figure 8.2 Conditional ﬁxed-effects regression of turnout behavior on perceived
political supply
Notes: Reported are log odds on a logarithmized scale with 95 percent conﬁdence intervals. Samples
sizes, observed values: Model I (N=344; O=739); Model I + Control (N=277; O=584). Samples
sizes, imputed values: Model I (N=1028; O=2364); Model I + Control (N=919; O=2097); Model II
(N=919; O= 2097).
13 I am grateful to Maria Preißinger for providing her user-written Stata-Code for this analysis.
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This probability will serve as the reference value for a variable which has
no observable effect on the outcome. This reference will be compared to a
scenario where (1) the variable of interest changes by the sample’s average
intra-individual change between two elections and (2) a higher/lower intra-
individual change occurs at one standard deviation above/below the average.
A voter’s conditional probability of turning out at one speciﬁc election
drops to 31.1 percent when the summary evaluation of the political party
closest to her or him decreases by a magnitude well above the average change
from one election to the next, compared to a 35.6 percent chance of turning
out when her or his evaluation of the political parties had brightened. The
respective values for higher-than-average changes of valence-based alienation
are 32.0 percent and 34.7 percent. To put these ﬁgures into perspective, if the
sense of voting as a citizen’s duty changes by an equal magnitude, it raises the
conditional probability of switching the electoral participation from absten-
tion to turnout at this election from 26.1 percent to 41.4 percent.
Summing up the results so far, we see that while indifference seems to be
inconsequential for turnout, the perception of improved representation by
the political parties compared to previous elections induces voters to cast a
ballot who have not done so before. Yet the changes in the political supply the
average voter perceives exert a slightly weaker effect on turnout behavior than
average changes in political interest and a noticeably weaker effect than
similar changes in the sense of civic duty.
Due to missing values, the standard errors grow remarkably with each
additional variable included in the model. 1382 individuals switched electoral
participation and could in principle have been included in the analyses.
However, Model I is based on 716 observations of 340 individuals only. The
inclusion of control variables further reduces the sample size to 584 observa-
tions of 277 individuals.14 To provide evidence that the above-described
results were not caused by listwise deletion of cases with missing data,
I employed multiple imputation which makes use of all information available
and reran the analyses.
Panel 2 in Figure 8.2 reports replications with imputed data of the models in
Panel 1. Both panels paint a similar picture and bolster conﬁdence in the
evidence presented above. Differences appear regarding valence-based alien-
ation, and their effect is still statistically distinguishable from zero as a conse-
quence of the higher statistical power in the imputed case. A second difference
concerns alienation with respect to the generalized evaluation of political
parties, which even exhibits a small positive effect on electoral participation.
This appears to be the result of a suppressor effect, since alienation exerts no
14 When comparing these ﬁgures to the usual sample sizes in cross-sectional analyses, one needs
to keep in mind that ﬁxed-effects analyses account for time-invariant heterogeneity by design.
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effect in the bivariate case and only does so when the four control variables are
included in the model (see Figure 8.A4 in the Appendix).
The sample size of the imputed dataset also allows us to test the hypothesis
of stronger effects among cognitivelymobilized voters. The expectation is that
voters who are more interested in politics and have a higher level of formal
education will have more information at their disposal on the parties’ devel-
opment and will therefore be more likely to base their behavior on more
sophisticated considerations. Contradicting this expectation, the effect of
political supply on electoral participation is not stronger among cognitively
highly mobilized voters than among voters with levels of education and
interest below the average (Figure 8.3).15 Furthermore, policy-based evalu-
ations which were argued to be more demanding do not exert detectable
effects on the total sample. They do not exert any substantial effects among
the subgroup of cognitively mobilized voters either. The hypothesis of cogni-
tive mobilization moderating the transmission of perceived party movements
into turnout behavior must be rejected.
Alienation: Summary Evaluation
Alienation: Ideological
Indifference: Summary Evaluation
Indifference: Ideological
Alienation: Valence
Alienation: Foreigners
Indifference: Foreigners
Indifference: Valence
Civic Duty
Satisfaction with Democracy
PID (d)
Alienation: Nuclear Power
Indifference: Nuclear Power
1 2 3 4
Low Cogn. Mob. High Cogn. Mob.
Figure 8.3 Effects of political supply among subgroups of the electorate
Note: Reported are log odds on a logarithmized scale with 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
15 The model has been estimated separately for the lower and upper half of cognitively
mobilized.
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Conclusion
This chapter investigated the variability of individual turnout decisions over
time and their dependence on dynamic characteristics of the political context.
With respect to the German federal elections from 1994 to 2013, turnout
behavior was found to be characterized by inertia for most eligible voters; in
accordance with the predisposition approach to electoral participation only a
minority of 14 percent of the electorate switched between abstention and
turnout. Still, the changing political environment which the dynamic-
contextual approach emphasizes plays a part in consideration of some voters
about whether to participate electorally or not. In the eyes of many public
intellectuals as well as prominent scholars, political parties play an important
role in turnout decisions. However, the dynamic perception of the menu of
political offerings a voter can choose fromas supplied by the political parties has
limited power in explaining changing turnout behavior. Among those voters
who did switch, the transition in turnout behavior could not be explained by
dynamics in alienation or indifference with respect to the parties’ offerings in
ideological or policy positions. Yet in line with valence theories of electoral
behavior which stress the low-information rationality of voting, competence-
based perceptions and summary evaluations have a substantial effect on turn-
out. This effect is mainly driven by alienation: when voters develop a more
favorable view of the political parties than in the previous election in terms of
the parties’ generalized evaluation or perceived competence, then they are
motivated to switch from abstention to voting (and vice versa). But the political
parties’ capacity to raise turnout rates is rather narrowcompared to the inﬂuence
of other determinants such as the perceived duty to vote.
This study employed long-term panel data that observed voters’ behavior
within a dynamic political context over several elections and their reactions to
the changing political supply. Although this type of data poses speciﬁc prob-
lems (small sample sizes, missing values, inconsistent measures over time), in
combination with ﬁxed-effects regression analyses it produces effect estimates
of political supply on voter turnout that are more trustworthy than previous
models because it guards against many forms of spurious correlation. These
results, however, describe the average effects of six elections in one particular
country. Future research could take different countries with diverse party sys-
tems into account. Furthermore, it might be worth investigating whether the
effects of party perceptions vary with characteristics of a party or of the election.
Above all, this study has shown that turnout behavior varies across elections
among a signiﬁcant minority of voters, but perceptions of political parties can
only account for a small fraction of this dynamic. Future studies, therefore,
should try to identify additional factors that explain what mobilizes previous
abstainers to vote and what discourages former voters from casting a ballot.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 1/6/2017, SPi
Alexander Wuttke
162
Comp. by: C. Vijayakumar Stage : Proof ChapterID: 0003135660 Date:1/6/17
Time:20:33:21 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0003135660.3D
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 163
A
p
p
en
d
ix
o
f
Fi
g
ur
es
an
d
Ta
b
le
s
Ta
b
le
8.
A
1
In
cl
ud
ed
(✓
),
m
is
si
ng
()
,o
r
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
lly
m
od
iﬁ
ed
(~
)
ite
m
s
in
th
e
da
ta
se
t
LT
P
19
94
–
20
02
LT
P
19
98
–
20
05
LT
P
20
02
–
9
LT
P
20
05
–
13
LT
P
20
09
–
17
19
94
19
98
20
02
19
98
20
02
20
05
20
02
20
05
20
09
20
05
20
09
20
13
20
09
20
13
C
iv
ic
D
ut
y
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
Sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n
w
ith
D
em
oc
ra
cy
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
PI
D
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
Po
lit
ic
al
In
te
re
st
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
Le
ft
–
Ri
gh
t
Po
si
tio
n
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
Pa
rt
y
Ev
al
ua
tio
n
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
N
uc
le
ar
Po
w
er
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
~
✓
~
Fo
re
ig
ne
rs
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
~
✓
✓
✓
✓
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 1/6/2017, SPi
Comp. by: C. Vijayakumar Stage : Proof ChapterID: 0003135660 Date:1/6/17
Time:20:33:22 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0003135660.3D
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 164
Ta
b
le
8.
A
2
Re
gr
es
si
on
ta
bl
e
of
th
e
m
od
el
sh
ow
n
in
Fi
gu
re
8.
A
1,
le
ft
pa
ne
l
M
od
el
M
od
el
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
1
1
+
C
Tu
rn
ou
t
A
lie
na
tio
n:
0.
89
0.
92
0.
89
Id
eo
lo
gi
ca
l
(0
.0
6)
(0
.1
0)
(0
.1
2)
In
di
ffe
re
nc
e:
1.
05
1.
11
1.
07
Id
eo
lo
gi
ca
l
(0
.0
7)
(0
.0
9)
(0
.1
2)
A
lie
na
tio
n:
Su
m
m
ar
y
0.
77
**
0.
76
**
0.
86
Ev
al
ua
tio
n
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
5)
(0
.0
6)
In
di
ffe
re
nc
e:
Su
m
m
ar
y
0.
86
**
0.
95
1.
04
Ev
al
ua
tio
n
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
6)
(0
.0
8)
A
lie
na
tio
n:
Va
le
nc
e
0.
52
**
0.
64
0.
70
(0
.0
6)
(0
.1
2)
(0
.1
7)
In
di
ffe
re
nc
e:
Va
le
nc
e
0.
63
*
0.
92
1.
01
(0
.1
1)
(0
.2
6)
(0
.3
8)
A
lie
na
tio
n:
N
uc
le
ar
0.
95
Po
w
er
(0
.0
5)
In
di
ffe
re
nc
e:
N
uc
le
ar
1.
10
Po
w
er
(0
.0
6)
A
lie
na
tio
n:
1.
01
Fo
re
ig
ne
rs
(0
.0
4)
In
di
ffe
re
nc
e:
0.
95
Fo
re
ig
ne
rs
(0
.0
4)
C
iv
ic
D
ut
y
2.
00
**
(0
.2
5)
Sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n
1.
34
w
ith
D
em
oc
ra
cy
(0
.1
6)
PI
D
1.
50
(0
.3
8)
In
te
re
st
in
1.
48
Po
lit
ic
s
(0
.2
4)
N
94
5
91
4
14
58
14
46
17
66
17
66
88
4
81
5
84
1
70
1
71
6
58
4
N
ot
es
:E
nt
rie
s
ar
e
lo
gi
st
ic
re
gr
es
si
on
co
ef
ﬁ
ci
en
ts
w
ith
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
*p
<
0.
05
;*
*p
<
0.
01
.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 1/6/2017, SPi
Comp. by: C. Vijayakumar Stage : Proof ChapterID: 0003135660 Date:1/6/17
Time:20:33:22 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0003135660.3D
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 165
Indifference: Summary Alienation
–.3 –.2
Indifference: Ideological
Alienation: Ideological
Alienation: Summary Evaluation
Election Study=2009
Election Study=2002
Election Study=1998
Age
East Germany
Sex
Political Interest
PID
Civic Duty
Education
Turnout
Switcher
–.1 0 .1
Figure 8.A1 Fixed-effects regression on response rates among panel respondents
1994
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
1998 2002 2005 2009 2013
Ideological Valence
Summary Evaluation
Nuclear Power
Foreigners
Figure 8.A2 Development of indicators of alienation, 1994–2013
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Figure 8.A3 Development of indicators of indifference, 1994–2013
Note: Entries are OLS coefﬁcients with 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
Observed
Alienation: Summary Evaluation
Alienation: Ideological
Indifference: Summary Evaluation
Indifference: Ideological
Alienation: Valence
Indifference: Valence
Civic Duty
Satisfaction with Democracy
PID (d)
Interest in Politics
.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Imputed
Bivariate Model l   + Model ll Model ll + Control Variables
Figure 8.A4 Models with imputed and observed data demonstrating a suppressor effect
of summary evaluation: Alienation
Note: Reported are log odds on a logarithmized scale with 95% conﬁdence intervals.
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